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Abstract
Using a multivariate distribution of traders' information with correlations,
we specify the traders' bidding strategies on tenders of European soft wheat
intervention stocks. We show that correlations may have opposing effects
on their traders' bidding strategy, depending on their valuation of the grain.
This structural approach allows us to estimate the traders' strategies us-
ing two different econometric methods. In particular, under the common
value assumption, it is possible to estimate the extent of correlations be-
tween traders' information.
Traders' bidding strategies on EU grain export
refunds: An analysls with ii-it.a A.p;;dàni,Àiiunr.,
1 Introduction
The uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (uRAA), which ended in1994 long lasting multilateral trade negotiationr, ùu, significantly reformed
the rules applying to agricultural trade. Countries agreed to substantially
reduce agricultural support and protection by establisiring disciplines in the
area of market âccess, domestic support, and export subsidies, However,
state Trading Enterprises (srE) are prominent among wheat exporters andimporters, and the resulting trade regimes are often ,roiu, clear as the SRAA
rules. As a result, the lack of price transparency still remains one of the
major trade policy problems on the international grain market. As noted byAckerman (1998), "srE's lack of price transparency could be used .to mask
export subsidies and import tariffs." That State trading could distort theinternational trade as been long recognized,. This imperfect functioning mayimpede competition between traders and must be ieflected in the traders,
behaviors on the demand andf or on the supply side of the market (see, e.g.
wilson et al,, lggg). The following analysis aims at assessing the tradedistortion on the grain market by charactefizing the traders' bù strategies
on its European supply side.
In its internal grain market, the European union (EU) sets an annualintervention price which is a target price for intra-Eù trade: This policy
constitutes a commitment by the EU that farmers can seil their productsto the intervention authorities at this price. Then, grain herd in interven-tion stores is disposed of on the European market or through export. Inthe latter case, the European commission (EC) has to subsiàize tiaders tobridge the gap between the domestic price and the world price, when theformer is greater than the latter, which has been frequently the case over thelast decades. The EC can resort to several kinds ofsubsidies, called .*port
refunds' This paper aims at characterizing the traders' bidding strategiesduring the EU export refunds which are tendered for. our objËctive is" todetermine the traders' valuations of the cereals tendered bv thl Europ.u'
authority. In this respect, two opposite assumptions can be considered. oneis that the object has a value that differs from one trader to another. This
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assumption is referrecl to as the ,,private values,, paradigm. Conversely, thesecond assumption is that the biaàerr, uutuutiLrîî rir. object are the sameafter the aucrion, but bidders Jor,* know thir;;;; precisery at the time ofthe auction' This assumption i, ,.rurr.a ," 
". 
,rr.;,.I**on varue,, paradigm.
'i'iîïi,1[Xïï,',1ii:'i:ï.',',:î;;;,'";fr :i*:i"mmonva,ueàccordinsabout traders' varuatiÀs r'u, j*pr.ations r". ir,ï'"rlifif;li:i fflîîi:".ilgrain market. For exampre, if tte private values assumption turns out tobe correct, this may revear segmentation of the worrd market. on the otherhand, in the case of the comiron uulr.I-rr;rg;, trua. appears to be theresult of a unique and homog.rr.ou, worrcl mariet'where competition is notimpedecl' Thus, by charact.rffitnu 
-uin ruuiu.u"'of tr*d.rs, behavior, wecan obtain an indirect chamcterization of the worrd grain market.
. 
To this end, we specify and estimate the uiJà.rrï behavior in a tender_rng procedure, under the assumption that traders have (rimited) correratedestimates of the.tendered object'.-we thus ."r;;;;restriction of indepen_dent individuar infor*ution,"*'Jch.is usuariy irrp"..a in empiricar studiesbased on structural moders'or ]".ïi".r. (r.u, *;Ë;"rreon and Le Roux,1996)'1 The relaxation of this resLlction in trr. tîÉÀicar riterature on auc-tions was made bv M'grom 
"na-wïu.. rrgsij,"*;r,.îîrouiau a fairry generalframework. However, ih.i, un*iyri, has not'ouJ f;ilwed by empirical in_vestigations, certainly because 
"r,rl comprexity of estimation procedures in_volving multivariate distribution, oirut.ni uu.ilui.r."i" ,rr. folrowing, \4/e usea family of murtiv_ariate distrib";; i^/ith rimitea 
.àrrÀtions, elaborated byGourieroux and Jouneau (ronnl'ïit.r, permits u, to â.riue expricit formu_lations of marginal distributl;;:: (I; thà case we conrid.r, rhis distriburionconstitutes a simole approximari"Joi the multivarà"*ïorrn"r distributions.)This distribution alloil il;;p*tilrn. t.ua.rr,-fiâî*.tior* under the rwocontrasting assumptions and to unulyr"the effects of co*erations on traders,behavior. In particurar, we rh;;# correration, *uy t uu. opposing effectson the bidding strategies, a.p."ai"S"on the paradigm.We apply this modeling io ,,rr. iri,u.ginj of .*i*t refunds by the EU.In particujar, assuming thai tù ïlrtiu"rio'I oi b-id-;;;, private information
-rne nrst study which has developed an investigation of the quesiion of private vai_ues versus common varue is paarsh rgài.-i", 
" 
pËJ;;;;;;r'oîr".un, deveropments ineconometrics of auctions, see Laffont anïVuong fSOO.
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areindependent,lvecanderivetheexpectationandthe.varianceofthewin-
ning bids and the àxpectation of the second-highest bid under 
the private
value assumption. Under the common value assumption, the 
linearity of the
bid function allows us to specify the two first-moments for both the 
first
and the second uià in the leneral case. Using these theoretical 
moments,
we estimate the traders, strategies using fuo àpproaches: The 
Generalized
Method or uo*.ntr*(il";;;, tîaz;, whlch p.r*itr a direct inference of the
whole set of ,.tuuu,,t pu,u*.t.',, uod the Asymptotic Least Squares method
(Gourieroux, Monfori and Trognon' 1985)' thit tutttt T.t]nt-*:Ïl:,t;.o:.t
two-stage estimation: In the first stage, a simultaneous linear 
Ïegresslon es-
timates the eff'ects of exogenou, variaËles on the expected value 
of the latent
variables (i.e., the à* pori value of the tendered good) up to a constantl 
in
the seconcl stage, we derive estimates of this constant and 
of the second-order
characteristics of the latent distribution, using auxiliary variables 
obtajned
in the first stage. compared to the GMM, ih; ALS method is particularly
simpie to implement, and the estimates it provi'des constitute a good 
initial
value for the GMM estimation process'
since the expected values ol th. flrst and second bids lead to the same
reduced forms for the estimating equations within the two paradigms 
(as-
suming independence), no specificaiion test can be used to determine 
the
relevant paradigm. Inâeed, the same regressions are used for both 
paradigms'
However, the estimations iead to the c-onclusion that the common 
value as-
sumption is more relevant in our case.z Moreover, within thiS 
paradigm'
it is possible using our specifications to estimate the extent of correlations
between traders' individual informations'
Thepaperi,o'gu,,'i,.dasfollows.Section2summarizestheauction
theory that we use tà model EU tenders. Section 3 provides a 
presentation of
the econometric methods used to estimate the two competing 
models' Lastly'
section 4 reports empirical applications of these methods to the 
tenders of
European soft wheaf intervention stocks, and concludes on the 
existence of
correlations
2This was alreadY the case when considering the winning bid only (see Bourgeon 
and
Le Roux, 1996)
3
2 Bidder strategies under affiliation
we begin this secti_ol yilh a brief presentation of the auction model of Mil_grom and weber (19s2). we refer to the se[er ur,,pri*ipal,,and the potentialbuyers as "bidders". Milgrom and weber assume itrut à.r, bidder received apersonal signal of the item's value. However, this value may depend on bothits intrinsic characteristics and on the other bidders,signars, More precisely,denoting by ao the signal perceived by the individuaï i: lv a_,i : (o)i*othe vector of the n 
- 
L signals of the other bidders, ancl by c the intrinsiccharacteristic of the item, the individual varue or ine ftem ai is given byui:u(c,at,a-t), This function covers two extreme cases: one is the privatevalues assumption, the individual,s varue of the item being his/her privatesignal solely: u;: u(c,at,a-r.) : ai for all c and, a_i. The other case cor_responds to the common value assumption, the item's value being the samefor all individuals, given by irs intrinsic.h";;;;iJ;; i..*., rhe resale priceof the item); u; : u(c, ai, a-i): c. Before the auction, the individual knowsonly his own signal, and neither the signars of the other bidders nor the in_
l*l:r.I::?:yï:X of the ir..T: His. vatuarion is tr,r, . random variabte
lncreasing? we have
EIIi(ai,bù : E[(V _ b,i)Lgi4r,Ai1b._t(b1)]lAr: ail
: (Y)i=t,...,,' denote the ranked vector derived from the individuarestimates A: (A)i=r,...,nt satisfying y>yrr...; yr,. We have
{vi # i,, Ai { b.-t@ù} ë {y, < u.-t(uu)}
Let also u(ut,ry) deno-te the expected varue of the item given the firstand the second highest individual ,igrrals y and, Uzt i.ê.,
u(AuAz) : E[Vtlyr: Atky2:,yr\
The expected profit of bidder z becomes
ETI;(a6,bt) : E[(u(oo,Yr) 
- 
b;)Lgr<u.-i(àr)] ly : a,il
Denoting bv Fvr,Hy.:). and, fy,('lyr) the cumulative distribution function(cDF) and the probuuilitv dir;;ib;;i"n funcrion (pDF) of y2 given s1, rhisexpression can also be written as
-1(br.)EfIi(a;,b): (, (oo, y) 
- 
b;) d, Fy, (y loo)
ôILj(atbù
0ôbt
I,u.
where a is the lower bound of the support of A6. Assuming a differentiableequilibrium strategy b*('), anecessary condition for ô-(.) to be a symmetricequilibrium is
This condition defines a first_order
given by (usine b*(o,\ : u(n. n\ enÀ î (
bt=b* (at)
differential equation whose solution is
^.1^ \ _ r\
We thus have the following result:
[Mitgrom and Weber, 1982] Under the symmetry and affiliation âssump-
tions, assuming that the selier's reservation price is less than a, the symmetric
equilibrium strategy is given bV (1) and (2)'
As mentioned above, this result encompasses a iarge set of situations, but
in order to characterize the effects of correlations and to estimate the traders'
behavior, we shall restrict ourselves to the two extreme cases of bidders'
valuations, namely the private values and the common value assumptions.
We shall derive these specifications using a multivariate distribution family
constructed by Gourieroux and Jouneau (1994). This particular multivariate
CDF f(a1 ,...,an) is designed using an univariate CDF F(oo) according to
the fbrmulaa
F(or, on) 1+rfS(q)S(ay) fI r(o,) (3)i<j j=1
n
where ,9(o) : I- F(a) and r < 2l(n(n- 1)) (which guarantees that 0 S F <
1). The parameter r links the individual signals together, the independent
case corresponding to r : 0. Consequently, r is intimately related to p, the
correlation coefficient between two variables (p : CoulAi,AÀlo', where o is
the stanclard deviation of the ,4;s). In particular, using results established
by Gourieroux and Jouneau, it is easy to show that p is a linear function of
r given by
p:4rE2lTHg))
where ? is the standardized statistic derived from A, and 1/(') its distribu-
tion. Assuming further that F is the normal distribution, we have
p<2n(n-1)tt
This family of distributions thus exhibits only limited correlations be-
tween variables. Moreover, these correlations are decreasing with the number
aThis expression constitutes a particular case of the family of distributions considered
by Gourieroux and Jouneau, which simplifies using the assumptions of symmetry and affil-
iation of the Milgrom and Weber model. Observe that both the multivariate distribution
F(.) and the component distribution F(.) are conditional to the item's intrinsic value C,
at least in the common value case. We omit indication of this conditionality in this section
to save on notations.
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of random variables.s
The preeminent property of (3) is that marginal distributions and dis-
tributions of the ranked random variables derived from these statistics are
easily computed. In particular, F1, the CDF of YL, is given by
]:( i,<j
F(aù
Fr(at) P )(to < aù
i
1+rf S(aù' F(aù
(.ry's(o')') (4)
In the appendix, we also derive Ft,z(At,y2), the joint distribution of
(Y,Yz), and consequently Fvr('), the distribution of Yz conditional to Yr
Using (3), we thus can specify the equilibrium strategies b-(') of the Mil-
grom and Weber model with correlations (see annex). Moreover, since r is
restricted to small values by construction of (3), linear approximations in r
around r :0 constitute good proxies of these strategies.
We first consider that the individual signals are noisy estimates of the in-
trinsic value of the item C. It is easy to generalizethe previous approach by
allowing the constituent distribution F to be conditional on c, i.e., .F(alc).
In the following, we assume that the a priori distribution of. C is constant
(see Thiel, 19SS).6 Moreover, we assume F (alc) is normal, with an expected
value given by c. The PDF is thus /(alc) : S(t) lo, where t : (a - c) f o and
d(.) is the PDF of the standard normal distribution (and we shall denote
by ô the corresponding CDF). The following proposition characterizes the
bidding strategy.
Under the common value assumption, assuming F is normal, the equilib-
rium strategy (1) and (2) simplifies to
bi@o) 
- 
a,i 
- 
oan(r) (5)
5A similar result holds for any distribution fI(') of ?. Indeed, we have
8_.p < -,: ^Ezlrïg)l' n(n-I)
6For a discussion of this approach, see Levin and Smith, 1991
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where
, _, _ 
EnlT'l + rn (n 
- 
7)l!"(72 
- 
I) 12ttn\t) 
-
with
{)*(T - Enyyl - 2 (n - t) (n + z) E,+t[rl * (" ; 1l \?: 2) !^r2" E*+zlrln(n+r) un rL4r r @+r)çn+21
and E; lrl:,1$tao1t)'. An approximation of (5) is given by
bi@o) x b[(a) 
- 
roKn (6)
where
bô(ou) 
- 
ai on"lrr) lE"lrl
and
o^ _ 
n(n 
- 
7)l!"g) (r!"(T'z 
- 
L) 
_ 
E" [?']\
- 2 Em\-qîI- Em)
See annex.
Observe that the bid function (5) is linear and that the correlations affect
the constant term a"(r) only. This last term is a non-linear function of r, but
(6) uses the fact that r is small to approximate (5). For given r and o, the
difference between this approximation and ôfi(.), the bid function without
correlation, depends on a constant nn. Table 1 presents the values of rcn
corresponding to different numbers of bidders n,,
According to Tabie 1, the term 
-ron, is positive, and decreases when the
number of bidders n increases. The correlation between individual estimates
thus induces a more aggressive bidding strategy than in the independent case.
The bidding strategies are depicted in Figure 1.
The bidding strategy using Thiel's specification is still linear under the
affiliation assumption. In Figure 1, only the positive part of this offer strategy
is depicted. (Indeed, under the normality assumption, negative values of
the individual signals are allowed.)7 The bid function with correlation b|
is located between the bisector and the bid function without correlation bfi.
TThere exist other specifications, restricted on Ra, that give linear bid functions (see,
e.g., Wilson 1992), but also involve computational difficulties. Moreover, as shown in
Bourgeon and Le Rou-x (1996), the estimations of the independent case using normal and
log-normal distributions are very close.
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Consequently, for a given signal ai, the bid with correlation is greater than
the bid r,vithout correlation for any value of the signal.
Simpie econometric methods allow us to estimate the structural param-
eters within each paradigm. These methods involve the first two moments
of the winning bid and of the second bid. Using (5), we have the following
results:
Using (S), ttre expectations and variances of the winning bid and the
second bid are given by
EIB' lCl : c - oan(r) * oq (I,r)
ElBpylcl : c 
- 
oan(r) + o92 (r1 r)
VIB*lCl : o' (vrQ,r) 
- çr (I,r)')
VIBQ)|C\ : o' (vrQ,ù 
- Pr(1,')')
where tp1 and tp2 àt€, given by
/7- --\ 17 l,nk1 , 
-n(n-I) f o Vnkl .)F lq-hl
(7)
(s)
(e)
(10)
D l.f,tl \
It is also possible to derive the optimal strategy assuming private values
using the distribution (3). However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to use
the following result
Under the private values assumption, the equilibrium strategy (1) and
(2) may be approximated by
bi@o) : bit@ù 
- 
r (n 
- 
t) C(aù (11)
where
7 *, , I:' F(a)"-tda?o\at) 
- 
ai- 
--F@F:-
and
c(a): f' F(a)"-' (I, r(on)"-t \
S(y) +,S(ar) 1 (s(y) 
- 
s(aa)) dy
2 n
See annex.
The first term of (11) corresponds to the bid function without correlation.
The second term thus summarizes the effects of the correlations. In partic-
ular, since for all U I q we have S(y) à S(oo), the sign of the integrand
ot C(aa) is the same as the sign of (^9(g) + S(a;)) 12 - Lln. For low signals,
such that ,S(o,) > 7ln, C(a) is strictly positive and ô|(a;) < bi@ù. For high
values of the signal, and specific distributions, that may no longer be the
case. For example, assuming that F is uniformly distributed on [0,1], C(q)
is negative if ai> (n+2) (" 
- 
1) l("("+ 1)) (see annex). In that case, and
for n:2, we have b|(o,) > bô(ou) when o4 > 213. This threshold increases
rapidly with the number of bidders: For n : 4, C (aù is positive for private
values above 9/10 only.8 See Figure 2.
With correlations, the bidding strategy of an individual with a low val-
uation is smaller than the offer without affiliation ôfi(.): Indeed, because
the correlation between signals is positive, having a low signal suggests that
the others signals are also low and, accordingly, one can decrease the offer
sObserve that this threshold increases more rapidly than the expected value ofthe first
signai (among n) in the independent case. Indeed, this latter is given by nl@* 1) and
corresponds to our threshold for n = 2 only.
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compared to the independent case. The reverse reasoning applies for a high
valuation, i,e., for a private valuation considerably larger than the expected
value of the constituent distribution: If the private value of an individual is
close to this expectation and induces a winning bid, that signifies that all
other valuations are less than this expectation, and consequently, are rela-
tively small. A large signal is thus a signal substantially higher than this
expectation, and the difference required to qualify as 'large' increases with
the number of bidders.
As in the common value case, to estimate the traders' behavior on the
EU export refunds tenders, we have to derive the first two moments of the
winning bid and of the second-highest bid. Although (11) is linear in r, it
is a non-linear function of a, which seriously complicates the derivations of
these moments. However, using the equivalence revenue theorem in the in-
dependent case, it is possible to derive these moments for the winning bid,
and the expectation of the second bid, as demonstrated in the annex. Un-
fortunately, the equivalence revenue theorem does not hold in the affiliation
case (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982). We thus shall restrict ourselves to the
independent case to estimate the traders' behavior.
Assuming normal distributions of the Aas, with expected value and stan-
dard deviation cienoted by 7 and o respectively, and assuming furthermore
lhat r: 0, the expectations of the winning bid and the second bid and the
variance of the winning bid are given by
EIB*I: V+oEç21"1171 (12)
ElBzl: V+o(EplalTl-k) (13)
vlB*l : o'(k, 
- 
Eçz14lTl2) (14)
where 
r*oo
kr : n(n 
- 
1) J_* o(r)"-'(o(f) - ln(o(r)) - I)dt
and 
,/- 
- 
1\
r, : #@,lr')- 1) - f1u,-,7r1'
See annex.
For a given number of bidders, the expressions (12) and (13) are linear
in a ancl (14) is linear in o2. Moreover, these expressions are similar to
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their common value counterparts. Indeed, when r:0, the system (7) - (10)
simplifies to
EIB'lc1 : c 
- 
o(Enlr'l I n"lrl - E"lTl)
EIB@lcl : c 
- 
o(Enlrr) I a"pl _ Eça,1lrl)
vlB'lcl : o' (r,lr') 
- 
E"l\')
vlBçz1lc) : o' (Ep6lr'l 
- 
E1zp1lrlz)
As we shall see below, these similarities imply that we cannot discriminate
between the two paradigms using a statistical procedure.
3 Estimation procedures
The first method we present in the following is the Asymptotic Least Squares
estimation (ALS, see Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon, i985). This method
involves two steps, the first one being a simple least squares estimation of
some of the relevant parameters and a set of auxiliary variables, and the
second one consisting in inferring from the auxiliary variables the rest of the
relevant parameter (roughly, by solving a system of equations). The second
method is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, see Hansen, 1982)
and allows for a direct estimation of all relevant parameters at the same time.
We shall present these methods in the common value case.
For a given tender l, assume the following linear form for the expectation of
the common value cg
cL:o,o*tza'6
where a6 is a constant, U a veclor of exogenous variables, and ô the corre-
sponding vector of parameters. Using equation (7), the winning bid becomes
bT :'116 * at * eu. (15)
where lhe ep are assumed iid, with E[e1] : 0, and where a1 is a constant
satisfying
ar 
- 
do * olp, (1, 
") - a"(r)] : g (16)
t2
Using (S) and the same specification for c2, we have
bçz1t:t22.6 + a2l €24
where lhe ezt are iid, with E[e2] :0, and where a2 is given by
az 
- 
ao t o lp, (1, t) - a"(r)] : g
(17)
(18)
The first step of the ALS method consists in a constrained simultaneous
estimation of the two equations (15) and (17) (we have to consider the equal-
ity constraints on the components of d that appear in both equations). This
first step gives an estimate ô of ô (the parameters associated with zs) and
ô1 and dz of. the auxiliary parameters a1 and a2. Using the two series of
residuals corresponding to these equations, we can also derive the variances
of these residuals, ô26. and à'"rrr. However, this first step does not give an
estimate of the relevant paramefers ds, 6 and r.
The second step thus consists in inferring from the vector of auxiliary
variables 0 : (dr,A2,à28*,àlrrr),the vector of relevant parameters of the
distribution',( : (oo,o',r). In particular, using (9) and (10), we have
à'"- 
-o'(pr(2,r)-%(7,r)') * o (19)
ô'"rr, 
- 
o'(g, Q,r) - gz (l,r)2) * o (20)
The resolution of the system (16), (1S), (19) and (20) thus gives an indi-
rect estimation i : (do,t',î) of these relevant parameters. These estimates
are obtained by solving the following program
mlntc(B,4.So.c(p,t)
where G(9,ù is the system defined by the LHS of equations (16), (1S)' (19)
and (20), and 
^90 the matrix given by
So : (tVpG.C,.V pc)-t
: 9-t
where VpG denotes the Jacobian matrix derived from the vector G by dif-
ferentiation with respect to B, and
o : vlpl: ( vla' ' a'l vvru:, u,",,,1)
13
is the variance-covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameters. The variance-
covariance matrix vlyl of the relevant parameters is deduced from ft using
VItl : f Vrc.e-i.V.,Gl-t
(see Gouriéroux, Monfort et Trognon, 1gg5).
As noted above, when r :0, the systems to be estimated in the first step(either (7) - (s) under the common varue assumption or (12) - (18) ,;;;,the private values assumption) are the same. More precisely, if 'thâ set of
explanatory variables za is the same whether \4/e assume the private valuesparadigm or the common value parad.igm, the same least squares estimationgives the same parameters â for these variables. consequently, it is notpossible to discriminate between the opposite paradigms with some statistical
test. This was already the case in Bourgeon and Le Roux (1996), where only
the winning bid was considered.
The GMM method allows us to estimate all relevant parameters in the same
estimation process. Moreover, due to its generality, and to the moment con_
ditions imposed to the instruments, the GMM estimation use more efficiently
the information contained in the sample,
To identify the parameters, we have to use not only the series of the
endogenous variables b' and ô12;, but also the squared values of these vari_
ables, using the theoretic moments derived from (7) - (10) and the relation
v(x): EX2 
- 
(EX)'. Then, the four structural error terms of the model
can be written as
: Al 
- 
(,rn.6 * ao + olçL(I,r) 
- 
a,(r)l)
: bç21t. 
- 
('rn.6 * ao + olg2(I,r) 
- 
a,(r)l)
: (bi)z 
- 
(lrtn.6 * ao + o (pL (2,r) 
- 
a^(r))], + o,
: b'rqn 
- 
(['rn.6 * ro + o (ç2(2,t) 
- 
a,(r))]' + o, I
€tt
€2!
€st
€U.
lvrçz,r) - w( t,,)'1
,)'li
1)for / : I,..., L. Denoting by e2 the vector of
with Elesl: 0 for t, : L,...,L, the model is
orthogonality conditions of the form
Elungntl:0
Vz (2,r) 
- çz (7,
(2
error terms vL 
-
(enn)o=r,..,t,
assumed to satisfy a set of p
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where 14 is a vector of instrumental variables observed for each (..
Denote the p-vector 
€a@r4by Ha(O), where d is the vector of all structural
parameters of the model, i.e., 0 : (ô, o0, o, r). The GMM estimate î of 0 is
obtained by minimizing
Q@) :'G(o).s-r .G@)
where G(d) is given by
1LG(o): i,T n,(el
' r=L
One crucial problem in the GMM estimation is the choice of the weighting
matrix 5. Since the covariance matrix a of. Ha(0) is minimized when,S : fl-i
(Hansen, L982), the optimal weighting matrix necessitates a consistent esti-
mate of f), and thus of 9. A practical procedure of such a circular estimation
process, which also allows to solve the serial correlation problem, is proposed
by Newey and west (19s7) (see also Hamilton rgg4). Their estimation,S of
the matrix 5 is given by
S: î(o) * Ërt - j;1trî(j) +'îr.,llj=L
where rn is the lag truncation parameter and where
(22)
f(r) : f ,unç01.un_,çî1.1T
L
l=j*L
The first stage of the GMM estimation is performed setting 3o : Io.
The first stage estimate Ao of 0 is then use in (22) to compute 31, and the
procedure is iterated further until convergence. Finally, the covariance matrix
of the estimated parameters is derived using
v[o] : lfv,c ça1.31a; -'.va G (o)l-' .
4 Empirical results
The framework described above is applied to tenders of soft wheat interven-
tion stoclcs. Weekly tenders are presented in reports issued by the EC Cereals
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Management Committee. These reports contain information about purchase
prices of awarded lots, quantities of each lot, and places where lots are lo-
cated. Tenders apply to homogeneous lots by prefixing corrective, according
to differences in qualiiy on the one hand and to the destination of exports
on the other hand (to take into account freight costs but also to encourage
or discourage exports). The data set covers tenders held between December
1990 and June 1992, that is to say 424 awarded lots. Among them, we retain
tenders for which the value of the second highest bid is available in the data
set issued by the Management Committee, which reduces the data set to 41
observations. See Table 2.
Variables which can influence the traders' behavior can be divided into
three sets:
o time variables, which reflect seasonal shifters;
o price variables: posted and actual U.S. export price (i.e. U.S. bonuses
awarded within EEP are taken into account); the internai price, which
acts upon the timeliness of exports to the world market; exchange rate
of the French franc versus the U.S. dollar;
o quantity variables: EU and U.S. exports, and total EU exports awarded
the same day, which is related to the ex post reservation price.
For each auction [,,lhevariable ôf is the winning bid and the variablebç21t.
is the second-highest bid, both expressed in Ecu. The European internal price
is expressed in French francs (the parity between the French franc and the
Ecu is constant over the period of estimation), and world prices are expressed
in U.S. dollars. Following statistical tests, only these price variabies and the
exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the French franc are retained in
the final empiricai model,
we assume that there are 15 bidding traders for each auction, which
seems to be very close to the reality.
we first present empirical results in the independent case (r : 0) for both
paradigms, and then the results when signals are assumed to be affiliated(" > 0) in the common value case. Estimations are given using the two
estimation methods presented above. Finally, conclusions on the existence
of correlation will be drawn.
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Recall that this case colresponds to r : 0. First, we present and comment
on the parameter estimates using the ALS method. As pointed out above,
under both assumptions on traders' valuations, the first step of the ALS
method reduces to the same estimation. This first step involves regressions
of the winning bid and the second bid against a constant term and a set
of explanatory variables. The additional parameters which characterize the
distributions of the private values or of the signals are derived in the second
step only. This first step thus allows us to characterize the effects of the
exogenous variables on the private values as well as on the ex ante signals of
the common vaiue. The results are summarized in Table 3.
The exchange rate has a positive effect on bids: ceteris paribus, an in-
crease in the U.S. dollar involves higher bids, expressed in FYench francs. The
elasticity at the sample mean is equal to 1.98: any change in the exchange
rate not oniy induces a mechanical adjustment of European traders' bids,
but also speculative behavior of traders who anticipate further variations of
this exchange rate.
One important result is the effect of the actual U.S. export price. The
price used in our estimation is the fob U.S. price (HRW), corrected by an
average of bonuses. Traders' bids are obviously determined by this export
price. This confirms the leadership role of U.S. trade, and consequently
U.S. export subsidy policy. Such a strong result arises for each estimated
specification. Ceteris paribus, especially for the exchange rate, an increase of
one percent of the U.S. export price (at an average ievel of $ 85.29 over the
period) induces an average increase of about 0.95 percent of the European
traders' purchase price.
The internal price has a negative effect on winning bids, with an elasticity
of -1.6 at the sample mean. When this price increases it may be less profitable
to export to the world market than to sell in the European market. So traders
decrease their bids.
Estimation results of the second step are reported in Table 4'
Under the private values paradigm, the average of estimated private val-
ues is about 7 percent less than the winning bid. The standard deviation of
these private values is about 3.7 Ecus (around an average of 59 Ecus),n i.*.,
eBids and private or common values are expressed in Ecus, after excluding the "technical
refund," which is constant over the data set. Actual values may be obtained by adding up
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6 percent of the average, which implies a rather large dispersion of traders'
values. so, if the private values paradigm holds, the segmentation of the
world market among European traders would be significant.
It is noticeable that the average of the private values is always consider-
ably less than the winning bid corresponding to each lot (see Figure 3). one
can observe this gap on average over all the observations, with a mean ofprivate values expectation 7 equal to 5g Ecus, and a mean of the winning
bids ô' equal to 63.6 Ecus. Furthermore, once converted into U.S. dollars,
this value is often considerably less than the actual u.s. export price (see
Figure 3, where the actual u.S. export price is evaluated from the HRW ex_port price, minus an average of bonuses, plus an âverage freight rate from the
U.S' to Western Europe). The difference in quality is not sufficient to explain
this gap, which seems rather unrealistic. Whereas the aim of the tradàrs is
to speculate against the commission when bidding to get refunds (or to pur-
chase intervention stocks), it would mean that they always los. *onei o'
average. Indeed, the average of the traders' valuations (approximated bi f)
would be less than what they pay (that is the winning bids b,). Moreàver,
that would imply that European and u.s. prices are very high, relative to
European traders' valuations. Thus, the assumption of private values does
not seem to fit in with the empirical knowiedge of the market. conversely,
under the common value paradigm, the dispersion of ex-ante personal ap-proximations is rather low. The standard deviation of these signals is about
3 percent of the average of the common values (the standard deviation is 2
Ecus, while the average is G3.g Ecus), The estimated common values, con_
verted into a u.s. dollar export price, are generally srightly higher than the
u.S. export price (evaluated as previously) (see Figure 4). Moreover it isquite noticeable that this common varue is nearly equal to the average of
the winning bids (63.6 Ecus). That can be seen for each lot (see Figur; +).
With 15 bidders, the competition seems to be sufficient to lead to this closÉ-
ness: Here the seller's revenue (equal to the winning bid) and the average
of the bidders' valuation are the same, and consequently there is no rent fàr
the buyers. Then, the common value assumption seems more appropriate
than the private values paradigm. It is not possible to decide betwàen these
two assumptions with a statistical test, but v/e can favor the common value
paradigm on the basis of the implications drawn from the estimation results.
this technical refund
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The adequacy of the common value implies two main features of the world
grain market. On the one hand, the common value paradigm entails the
uniqueness of the price reference in the world grain market, in spite of the
complexity of its organization, the speculative behavior of traders and the
prominent role of the STEs. This conclusion is consistent with the behavior
of the European Commission which takes explicit account of the U.S. export
price in determining the necessary and acceptable refund (Ferret, 1991). On
the other hand, the closeness between the common valuation of traders and
the Commission's revenue points to the efficiency of the awarding procedure:
The traders buy intervention stocks at a price very close to their own valua-
tion. (Recall that all these conclusions essentially rely on a strong intuition
provided by an analysis of estimation results, but not directly on a statistical
procedure.)
The next tables present for each paradigm the estimations obtained with
both methods. One can see that estimates within the GMM are very close
to ALS results. Under the private values paradigm, effects of explicative
variables are nearly the same (Table 5). The characterization of private
values distribution involves an equal average of private values under both
methods (58.9 Ecus), but this value stays below the average of the winning
bids (63.6 Ecus), These results thus confirm our previous rejection of the
private values assumption as the relevant paradigm.
Similarly, the model estimated with the GMM under the common value
assumption is close to the one estimated with ALS (Table 6); Effects of
explicative variables are nearly equal, and the dispersion of the signals around
the common value is identical (2 Ecus). When the possible correlation among
valuations is not taken into account, GMM estimation do not lead to richer
results than the ALS method. Both conclude to a preference for the common
value paradigm.
Estimations under the assumption of correlated signals in the case of common
value are reported in Table 7. Effects of explicative variables (21) on signals
perceived by traders are nearly identical with or without affiliation: they are
strictly identical within the ALS method, since the correlation parameter r
does not appear in the first step of this method. Results obtained by the
GMM method âre very close to them.
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These estimations also confirm ihat the dispersion of ex ante personal
signals is rather low, whatever the method used. On average, the estimated
standard deviation of these signals is less than 3 percent of ihe average of
common values, that is about 2 Ecus, which is close to the estimations in the
independence câse. The estimated common value is on average equal to 63.g
Ecus within both methods, while the winning bid is on average equal to 63.6.
We can conclude that the winning bid is nearly equal to the common value,
on average and for each tender and this estimated common value converted
into a U.S. dollar export price is often either equal or higher ihan the U.S.
export price (HRW) (see Figure 5).
otherwise, the assumption of correlated signals seems appropriate: The
estimate of the correlation parameter r is about 0.06 using both ALS and
GMM methods, but significant only within the GMM method. Quantity vari-
ables, like volumes of exports, were not introduced as explicative variables,
but they can be taken into account as instrumentai variables within GMM.
The superiority of this method is verified here, as it leads to a better signifi-
cance of all parameters and a satisfactory goodness of fit.10
Estimation results with correlation do not noticeably modify conclusions
about effects of explicative variables on signals or about the dispersion char-
acteristics of these signals, but they strengthen the accuracy of correlations
among traders' informations.
Estimate of the correlation parameter r is particularly robust around 0.06,
which corresponds to an estimated correlation parameter p x 0.02. Intro-
duction of correlations undoubiedly allows us to capture more information in
this structural approach, adding up one component to the exogenous effects
which act upon the traders' behavior. However, this estimated value is more
than 6 times higher than the maximum value permitted by the distribution(3): For n: 15, this maximum value for r is LlL}s which corresponds to a
correlation parameter of 0.003.
Last, the characterization of the common value distribution confirms the
very low dispersion of ex ante personal approximations around the ex post
common value. The closeness of this value to the seller's unitary revenue
(equal to the winning bid) highlights the efficiency of the tendering compe-
10US exports of wheat have been added as instruments here. The validity of these
instruments in addition to the explicative variables is not rejected according to the test of
Hansen.
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tition, which results in no rent for traders.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the refund-awarding procedures for EU cereal ex-
ports using a structural approach based on auction models.
compared to previous analyses, this research permits us to relax the
assumption of independent bidders' informations usually imposed. Implica-
tions drawn from the estimation results favor the hypothesis of a competitive
world grain rnarket in spite of the lack of price transparency which is often
highlighied. Using the first and the second bid on these tenders, the estima-
tion results also show that the correlations between the latent distributions
are significant: The 'noises' around the mean value of the individual sig-
nals are correlated. This implies that the set of exogenous variables used
to parametrize these distributions fail to explain the traders' behaviors com-
pletely. In other words, the ex ante information that the traders have at their
disposal is wider than the ex post information used to estimate the model.
However, it seems doubtful that these correlations are the result of coordina-
tion between the traders: The winning bid is very close to the export price on
the world market. So, the EU awarding procedure seems to be competitive
and efficient.
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Annexes
1 Joint distribution of the first two signals
By definition, the joini distribution Ft,z(ar,az) of (y,yz) is given by
Ft,z(yt, az)
" lç (D,,o, s az))(a, < Ao= ,,,)]
P
lç [a (Ai < a,))(An <,,,)] -' lV )@i =,rf
" [V (D,,o,< az) f](a' = ,,,)]
with
and
with
0Ft,z(yt, az)
ôy,
: nF(y)F(yr)-' ,
1+rf s(y)s(s2)+r t s(aù,j*i k<j,k*i
(L+r(n-L)S(y)S(yr)
(
:n
+,sras'@-!f4)F(ar)F(aù-'
P U ll (av < a,) nP O(ai < az)j
: n\(az)
The conditional distribution of the second signal given the first one is given
by
Éa /^. r-. \ oFt,z(at,az)loattvz\uzlut) :-ffi
: hl" (t *,tn - r)s(aù (r(r,l + s(a,)+)) 
"(r,)o( uù*-,1
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and /r derived from (4) using
fr@r) : W : nF(al)n-' f @r) ( *Trs(yr)(ns(ar) - zr(arD)
: nF(ar)"-'f @ù (t *Trt@r)((n + 2) s(yr) 
- 4) (æ)
The corresponding PDF f1,2(yt,Az), is given by
f yz(Y1,Y2)
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- 
t) f (aùF(aù-'f @ù x
(r * 
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2 Equilibrium strategy under the common value
assumption
using f (o,1") : f (clou), the PDF of the marginal distribution of the first two
signals is given by (using (24)),
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./ 
-OO
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The estimated value of the item is
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and finally
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3 Expected values and variances of the first two
bids
Using (23), we have
Ë
t::
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The variance is given by
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and the expected value of the second signal is given by
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The variance of the second offer is
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4 Equilibrium strategy under the private val-
ues assumption
Using Fy, and (24), the likelihood ratio is given by
ffi:(n-t)ffi-rtos
and we have
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5 [Jniform distribution case
Assuming a uniform distribution over la,-a), the term C(ou) simplifies to
c(a): dy
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or equivalently (using a: A - a and ri: at - e),
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6 First moments within the private values paradigm
Assuming r:0, and denoting by tb(oo) 
= ïiâ F(o)"-rdulF(u;)"-I, we have
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where Fz : nFn-rl| 
- 
Fl + F". We thus have the well-known result that
with independent private values, the expected revenue of the seller is equal to
the expectation of the second higher private value. Assuming further normal
distributions of the V, wilh expected value and standard deviation denoted
bv V and o, we have
r*ooEIB'I : J_* @t + V)da2Q)
: l/ + oEp1,1[T]
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The expectation of the second highest bid is given by (assuming z6 : u)
where
where
f' ,t't larr{rl : n(n-t) l: I,' ,(r)"-rauç7çu11r@) - f (u))d,u
ll; ,rr-rau(n(r@)) - F(,))]:
ElBrl : I O - r!(u))d,Fr(u)
: EIB'I 
- l,' ,t,{r)oFz(u)
- l" ot l-1(tn(r(u)) - F(u))d'u
1D
J,, P(r)"-'(F(r) - ln(F'(u)) - I)du
With normal distributions, \Me thus have
ElBrl: E[B-] 
- 
n(n 
- 
L)o/Ï rtrl"-'(o(r) 
- 
ln(o(r)) 
- 
I)dt
The variance of the winning bid can be derived as follows (assuming
normal distributions, ?s 
- 
u)
VIB'I: El@*-E[B*])'l
: o' [** (L*:!151"- - Errra[r])'r*1r;'l-* \ olr;"-' /
: o' (ap1,t[r]" - 2n*ç4n1lrl l:: f'*,d,o(r)-Ig(t)at
*" I:: (l_*,ort')"-')' ,1,;-,'-' ) ë@dt)
l:: l:-rd,e(r)^-rô(t)dt : "ll:-rdo(r)"-1o(t)] E*oon
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-oo
-n(n-L) tô(t)o(ù-rdt
: 
"l:: tdo(t)-t-@-L)t:: fia(t)"
l:: Lrd,e(r)*-r(n - r)tg(t)dt
(/: td,o(t1'"-t)2
.Y# Ë Lrd,e (r),-Ltô(t)dt
Since t$(t) : 
-ô'(t), we have
r*oo rt
Ë l:-rd,Q(r)n-Ltô(t)dt : - V:-rd'Q(r)'-r,i (r)]** + (, -t) /: ftft)2a(ù^-2dt
r*oo: I tô(ùdaft)-LJ _oo
: lt6(t)o(t)"-']l: - I** (f(t) + tô'(t))e(t)-r dt
: 
- I:: ôft)aft)"-.dt+ I:: f ôa)aft)"-rdt
11: 
-- 
+ :E,lT2lnn
and consequently
*oo
-oo
2nI-
'n-2
n
n-2
vlB*l: 02 2(n - L)n-2 (E,lT'l- 1) - f1a,-rlTl' - E1a^1[rf)
I
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n567891015202530
Kn -0.29 -0.26 -0.24 -0.27 -0.19 -0.18 -0.72 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
Table 1: Term affecting the (approximated) equilibrium strategy for given r
and o
Maximum Minimum Standarddeviation
Average quantity per lot t
trVinning bid (Ecus/t)
Second bid (Ecus/t)
4,696
63.57
62.52
17,800
87.01
82.74
525
57.37
55.22
3,835
4.48
4.47
Table 2: Tenders between December 1990 and June 1992
Constants
&1 -20.8281
(-1.51)
-21.8816
(-1.5s)
Residual standard deviations
oB-
Op
Variables Parameters ô
FF sd
(exchange rate)
Pus
(U.S. export price)
Peu
European Union domestic price
RMSE - Adjustment properties
7.58%
2.06%
Table 3: Estimation results with the ALS method (First step)
d,2
r.002
1.286
9.5
27.620
(6.7e)
0.710
(14.ss)
-0.084
bw
bot
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Constants Private values Common values
Q6
o
-25.4505
(-1.s4)
3.70402
5.90
58.95
6.28%
L07.8%
706.1%
-20.496
(-1./r8)
2.0r7
9.02
ean Values
ûlMv
Êçu*11w
Êçu,rr11ttv
c
63.91
3.16%
99.5Y
97.8%
Table 4: Estimation results with the ALS methods (Second step)
Constants ALS GMM
A6
o
-25.4505
(-1.s4)
3.70402
-23.596
(-1.71)
3.502
90 5.26
Variables
FF sd 2L.620 2L2L
(exchange rate) (6.79) (7.72)
Pus 0.710 0.696
(U.S. export price) (14.85) (17.1)
Peu -0.084 -0.083(Ert"p.-" U^f" a.
Mean Values
V
ûlv
58.95
6.28%
58.94
5.94%
RMSE
u 1
btzt 2.L% 2.r%
Table 5: Estimations of the private values model assuming independence
(Both methods)
1
Parameters ttù ô
tryt)I
Constants ALS GMM
A.g
ô
-2A.496
(-1.4s)
2.017
27.620
(6.7e)
0.710
(14.e)
-0.084
02) 66.5
-20.496
(-7.4e)
2.r75
2L.620
(3s.4)
0.715
(e5.4)
-0.084
FF
(exchange rate)
Pus
(U.S. export price)
Peu
European Union domestic
RMSE
9.57 54 .2(-
bw
btzt
7,6%
2.L%
7.6%
2.1%
Mean Value
ê
o/c
63.91
3.767
63,97
3.40%
Table 6: Estimation of the common value model assuming independence
(Both methods)
Parameters
38
Constants ALS GMM
d,g -20.501
(-1./,8)
1.901
(5.16)
0.068
-20.469
(-6.1o)
1.862
(2s. 1)
0.064
o
r
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2r.620
(6.7e)
0.710
(14.e)
-0.084
2L.429
(23.4)
0.628
(3e.8)
-0.078
02
Variables
FF Us
(exchange rate)
Pus
(U.S. export price)
Peu
ean Union domestic price
RMSE
9.57 18.7(-
b,a 1.6%
2.1%
2.\Y
2.4%
Table 7:
methocls)
Mean Value
c 63.90 63.94
"/ô 2.98% 2.e1%
Estimations of the common value model with correlations (Both
Parameters
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Figure 1: Bidding stategies - Common Value
a,i
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Figure 2: Bidding strategies - Private values
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Figure 3: US export price, winning bids, and average of the private values
(ALS estimation)
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Figure 4: US export price, winning bids, and common values (ALS estimation
without correlation)
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Figure 5: US export price, winning bids, and common values (GMM estima-
tion with correlation)
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